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Ronald Coase article from 1937, The Nature of the Firm, meant a new way of thinking and conceiving of 
the world, especially of economic organisations. Coase argued that the firm and the market represent two 
alternative ways to organise the same transactions and he aimed to explain what exactly foregrounds the 
choice  between  the  two  alternatives.  Basically,  Coase  starts  from  the  hypothesis  that  markets  do  not 
operate  without  costs;  their  operation  supposes  a  cost  of  the  use  of  price  mechanism,  identified  as 
transaction  cost.  The  latter,  in  its  turn,  explains  the  emergence  of  the  firm  as  an alternative  form  to 
coordinate transactions because, by internalising activities in its hierarchical structures, it can eliminate, 
partially or totally, costs associated with transactions. Beginning with the 1970s–1980s, neoinstitutionalist 
economists took over Coase’s message, developed it and started to explain the emergence of firms and 
other business practices as reaction to the existence of these costs.  
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Introduction 
Neoinstitutional Economics literature claims Ronald Coase as the groundbreaking initiator of 
what we call today transaction costs theory. Through The Nature of the Firm, his article from 
1937, Coase aimed to develop a new theory of the firm, starting from the observation that most 
economists consider “the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism”
176. He 
raises  the  issue  of  the  existence  of  firms  as  “islands  of  conscious  power  in  this  ocean  of 
unconscious co-operation”
177. According to him, they emerge because “within a firm, the market 
transactions  are  eliminated  and  in  place  of  the  complicated  market  structure  with  exchange 
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production”
178. This cost 
refers  to  “discovering  what  the  relevant  prices  are”  as  well  as  to  “costs  of  negotiating  and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market”
179, 
which Coase includes in the category of transaction costs. 
Thus, resorting to the market supposes a process of information-gathering and procedures to 
coordinate transactions that can be very costly and complex. Under such circumstances, the firm 
emerges as a viable alternative supplying, through its hierarchical structures, market structures in 
resource allocation.  
Coase did not intend to change the profile of economic theory. His self-declared goal was to 
introduce transaction costs to explain how firms came about. That was all. He did not mean to 
over-emphasise the concept.  
 
Dimensions of the concept 
As  we  have  shown  above,  the  origin  of  transaction  costs lies in  Ronald  Coase’s  conceptual 
innovation,  according  to  which  market  functioning  implies  certain  specific  costs  called 
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transaction costs. In a broad understanding of the term, they are considered “the costs of running 
the economic system
180.  
However, in the specialty literature, there is no consensus over what transaction costs are. In 
general, specialised literature delimits them according to their components. Hence, a plethora of 
interpretations which share a common ground but have shades of meanings that differ from one 
author to another. 
One of the existing classifications highlights two acceptations of transaction costs
181. The former 
associates them with involvement in an exchange on the market, and it is indebted to Ronald 
Coase. The emphasis is on exchange activities and, especially, on gathering information about the 
exchange. This vision equates transaction costs and information-gathering costs. Yet, the two 
concepts are not identical. Information costs are only a component of transaction costs. Thrainn 
Eggertsson explains this aspect by the fact that “a lonely person on a desert island will encounter 
information costs as he goes about his «home production» but an isolated individual does not 
engage in exchange and therefore will have no transaction costs”
182.  
In the latter acceptation, transaction costs emerge “whenever any property right is established or 
requires protection”
183. In this vision, transaction costs correspond to contracting costs and they 
can be subdivided into ex-ante and ex-post costs, vis à vis contracts. The former category refers to 
activities associated with information and negotiation, whereas the latter results from monitoring 
and enforcing contracts.  
Economic  organisation  seen  as  contracting  problem  is  the  theoretical  contribution  of  Oliver 
Williamson. He acknowledged Ronald Coase’s merits and made the concept of transaction costs 
operational, while transforming Coase’s explanatory model into a genuine paradigm.  
In Williamson’ analysis emphasis is laid on the concepts of bounded rationality, opportunism, 
asset specificity, transaction frequency, uncertainty. Briefly, human and environmental factors 
determine  the  existence  of  transaction  costs,  and  their  variation  is  accounted  for  by  the 
characteristic features of each transaction. For Williamson, transaction cost is the main reference 
point when looking for the best contractual arrangement, be it firm, market or hybrid. Within 
such  a  judgement  register,  the  rationality  of  economic  organisation  and  of  the  existence  of 
various contractual arrangements is none other but economizing on transaction costs. 
 
How high are transaction costs? 
Although  there  have  been  numerous  attempts  to  quantify  transaction  costs,  they  remain  a 
category that is hard to identify and, consequently, much harder to measure.  
A first attempt to quantify transaction costs at macroeconomic level was made by John Wallis 
and Douglass North in 1986 in the article Measuring the transaction sector in the American 
Economy, 1870–1970. In this study, the two economists measure the dimension of what they call 
transaction sector, starting from the division of the whole economy in two parts: transformation 
(or production) and transaction. By measuring the total value of the resources used in the sector 
of transactions, they obtained the aggregated value of transaction costs in the economy. Wallis 
and North showed that the whole sector of transactions represented 25% in 1870 and over 45% 
from the USA GDP in 1970. The methodology proposed by the two American economists has 
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inspired many other attempts to measure the transaction costs
184. For instance, from 1996 to 
2002, transaction costs in Polish economy increased from 49.7% to 67.5% of the GDP
185. 
At microeconomic level, transaction costs are considered a waste in economy. Transaction costs 
represent “the difference between what a consumer pays and what a seller gets”
186, a difference 
which is always positive. This is why, it is these costs should be as low as possible.  
Hernando de Soto’s pioneering study has led to the identification of some transaction costs that 
Wallis  and  North  had  overlooked.  They  are  expenses  caused  by  waiting  in  line,  obtaining 
authorisations to set up and develop a business, bribes, etc. He exemplifies with the following 
fact: 289 days were needed in the bureaucratic process to obtain the necessary authorisations 
from the State in order to set up a clothing company in Peru, in the first half of the 20th century. 
The  same  study  conducted  by  de  Soto  in  Tampa,  Florida,  showed  that  only  two  hours  are 
necessary there to receive the same type of authorisation
187. 
We  believe  that  the  explanation  lies  in  the  quality  of  the  institutions  necessary  for  the 
enterpriser’s unhindered activity and, ultimately, in economic development. Efficient institutions 
are the ones that diminish uncertainty in inter-human relations or, in the terms of neoinstitutional 
analysis,  they  diminish  transaction  costs.  This  is  the  reason  why  cost  transaction  theory  at 
microeconomic level can be understood only in the context of the general theory of institutions at 
macroeconomic level. 
 
Determinant factors 
Bounded rationality and opportunism 
The  theory  of  transaction  costs  in  neoinstitutionalism  is  built  on  two  essential  behavioural 
hypotheses: bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Bounded rationality is a cognitive hypothesis according to which “human agents behaviour is 
intendedly  rational,  but  only  limitedly  so”
188.  Neoinstitutionalists  concerned  with  issues  of 
transaction  costs  claim  Herbert  Simon  as  their  mentor  when  they  adopt  the  hypothesis  of 
individuals’  bounded  rationality  by  explaining  it  through  cognitive  limits  and  incomplete 
information.  Both  with  respect  to  information  collection  and  information  processing,  man’s 
cognitive capacities are limited. He is incapable to shape a complete and exact imagine of all 
possibilities of choice. Simon extended these principles to the level of decision mechanisms and 
he proposed the replacement of the model to maximise individual utility with the satisfaction 
model. In his conception, rational behaviour is satisficing but not maximizing. Man can have no 
claim to optimisation or maximisation; he can at the most satisfy his expectations. In Simon’ 
vision,  this  type  of  economic  behaviour  excludes  the  possibility  for  individuals  to  make 
calculations. 
Already inspired and influenced by Herbert Simon’s ideas, what matters for Williamson and for 
the theoreticians of transaction costs, is behaviour in an exchange relation in which individuals 
pursue their own interest. In this case, the individual proves to have bounded rationality but not 
naiveté.  Under  the  circumstances  where  ex-ante  judgements  become  relative  (being  limited 
rationally, man cannot anticipate all that will happen in the future in a contractual relationship – 
the ontological perspective of bounded rationality), individuals however have at hand a solution 
to satisfy personal interests: they are “allowed” to behave opportunistically. Opportunism refers 
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to the “self-interest seeking with guile”, to the “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, 
especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse”
189.  
Bounded rationality, opportunism and imperfect information find their solution in the incomplete 
contract, whose clauses are permanently adapted, depending on circumstances, on the succession 
of events that can unfold between the moment when he contract was signed and the moment 
when it is executed. Contracts are incomplete but, as Williamson mentions, they are also cautious 
in the sense that they must constitute credible engagements that should take into account issues 
that can emerge after the contract was signed. Thus, contract partners become aware of the risks 
that can emerge during the period covered by a contract and seek the best way to organise the 
transaction, by considering human and informational variables. And the best variant or, to put it 
differently, the best contractual arrangement is not an ideal one but one chosen in such a way that 
it  allows  “to  economize  on  bounded  rationality  while  simultaneously  safeguarding  the 
transactions in question against the hazards of opportunism”
190. 
However, choice is not made solely on the basis of human nature factors. The latter do not fully 
explain the existence of transaction costs and the necessity to adapt contractual arrangements 
depending on the context of the transaction. For instance, the bounded rationality of economic 
agents is a problem only in the context of the uncertain environment in which they act. Thus, 
other variables are associated to behavioural factors, which concern the transaction as such. The 
interaction between the two categories of factors is the one underlying the comparative approach 
to economic organisation. 
 
Transactions and their characteristics 
Transaction  costs  economics  place  transaction  in  the  centre  of  economic  production  and 
exchange  activities.  The  idea  is  taken  over  from  one  of  the  representatives  of  the  old 
institutionalism, namely John Commons, who argued that “the ultimate unit of activity (…) must 
contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality and order. This unit is a transaction”
191. 
Given the opportunism of the parties involved in the exchange, transactions do not automatically 
presuppose the harmonisation of interests. Most often conflicting situations occur. Consequently, 
transactions require the existence of an institutional framework. Williamson finds the solution in 
governance (through governance structures) seen as “the means by which to infuse order thereby 
to mitigate conflict and to realize (…) mutual gain from voluntary exchange”
192. 
In the attempt to explain why there are transactions that are not carried out through the market 
but suppose other ways of organisation (such as the hierarchical organisation), the transaction 
costs  theory  brings  as  its  main  argument  the  fact  that  transactions  cost.  They  cost  not  only 
because  the  individual  behaves  rationally  in  a  limited  and  opportunistic  way  (as  previously 
shown), but also because transactions possess certain characteristic features. 
Oliver Williamson identifies three main dimensions to describe transactions
193: frequency with 
which they recur; degree and type of uncertainty that they are subjected to; assets specificity. 
Each of these variables influences the level of transaction costs, which explains the preference for 
one particular modality of organisation or another. 
Frequency, as an attribute of transaction, starts from the idea that certain transactions repeat 
themselves  regularly.  In  Williamson’s  initial  conception,  the  higher  the  frequency,  the  more 
numerous are the possibilities that the contracting parties adopt an opportunistic behaviour. Thus, 
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the frequency of carrying out a transaction is supposed to be directly proportional with the level 
of transaction costs. Subsequently, he nuances his explanations by admitting that the repetition of 
similar transactions can lead to the emergence of reputation effects and favours the development 
of  certain  routines  in  the  contractual  relation  that  reduce  the  need  for  formal  coordination 
mechanisms and influence counter proportionally the level of transaction costs.  
Uncertainty refers to the “disturbances to which transactions are subject”
194. Given that economic 
agents  have  limited  cognitive  abilities  and  manifest  opportunistic  behaviour,  they  cannot 
anticipate all situations that will emerge in the future. Consequently, they will have to adapt ex-
post to unforeseen events (by renegotiating contract terms, for instance), which amounts to an 
increase in costs. 
If  the  transaction  is  uncertain,  subject  to  frequent  and  ample  perturbations  that  are  hard  to 
anticipate, contract parties cannot determine ex-ante, exhaustively, how the transaction must be 
organised. This aspect does not pose major problems if the parties involved are not dependent 
one on the other. If, on the contrary, the parties are in a relation of bilateral, mutual dependency, 
it is more complicated to govern the contractual relation, and it is very costly to give it up. This is 
where asset specificity becomes relevant. 
The argument of asset specificity, developed by Williamson, constitutes the basic “ingredient” of 
transaction costs theory. It refers to the “problem that is created when a part of the participants in 
a transaction make an investment in the physical and human capital and this investment cannot be 
recovered if the transaction is interrupted”
195.  
Specific investment is, thus, limited to the satisfaction of the needs of the parties involved. A 
certain bilateral dependence emerges: a lock-in situation determined by the costs that a potential 
break of the relation could cause. This option does not seem convenient to any party because in 
this case it would lose the economic value induced by specific investment. Yet, this does not 
mean that the parties will not seek to exploit their interdependence. Opportunistic behaviour 
forces  them  to  adopt  such  an  attitude.  The  party  of  bigger  negotiation  power  will  seek  to 
speculate  the  situation  via  an  ex-post  opportunity  cost  determined  as  the  value  of  the  best 
alternative use of the respective investment. The partner whose negotiation power is smaller has 
to choose between supporting specificity cost and obtaining certain smaller benefits than those 
stipulated  initially,  or  to  interrupt  the  contractual  relation  without  obtaining  anything. 
Opportunistic behaviour leads to the emergence of quasi-rents. “As assets become more specific 
and  more  appropriable,  quasi-rents  are  created  (and  therefore  the  possible  gains  from 
opportunistic behaviour increase), the costs of contracting will generally increase more than the 
costs  of  vertical  integration.  Hence,  ceteris  paribus,  we  are  more  likely  to  observe  vertical 
integration”
196. 
The  solution  that  neoinstitutionalists  find  to  the  problem  of  asset  specificity  that  generate 
opportunistic behaviour and high transaction costs is the organisation of activities inside the firm 
by adopting forms of vertical integration, with a view to save on transaction costs. 
 
Conclusions 
Transaction costs theory brings about a change of perspective in economy, and it has imposed 
itself  as  a  reply  to  neoclassicism  and  its  simplifying  hypotheses.  It  has  developed  its  own 
methodological  apparatus,  built  on  its  own  notions  and  categories,  and  integrating  its  own 
working hypotheses that offer a fertile ground to evince the meaning, the significance and the 
relevance of the analysed concepts.  
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All in all, we agree with Williamson’s opinion which says that “its best days lie ahead”. And one 
major concern for whoever invests his or her energy in the field of new institutional economics 
remains to identify transaction costs in various contexts and resource allocation systems.  
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